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Abstract—One of the central areas in network intrusion
detection is how to build effective systems that are able to
distinguish normal from intrusive traffic. In this paper we
explore the use of Genetic Programming (GP) for such a
purpose. Although GP has already been studied for this task,
the inner features of network intrusion detection have been
systematically ignored. To avoid the blind use of GP shown in
previous research, we guide the search by means of a fitness
function based on recent advances on IDS evaluation. For the
experimental work we use a well-known dataset (i.e. KDD-
99) that has become a standard to compare research although
its drawbacks. Results clearly show that an intelligent use of
GP achieves systems that are comparable (and even better in
realistic conditions) to top state-of-the-art proposals in terms
of effectiveness, improving them in efficiency and simplicity.
Keywords-intrusion detection; genetic programming; effi-
ciency; effectiveness;
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection is the process of monitoring and
analyzing the activity of a network or a computer system in
order to detect possible intrusion attacks [1]. The design of a
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is determined by
a set of decisions about raw data obtaining, event detection,
analysis rules, data storage and response procedures. Focus-
ing on the analysis techniques, artificial intelligence has been
widely explored, including approaches based on machine
learning, neural networks, evolutionary computation, etc.
In this paper we focus on the improvement of automatic
generation of analysis rules using Genetic Programming
(GP). Our research tries to improve the results on effective-
ness found in the literature while enhancing the efficiency
and semantics of the solutions. Thus, in terms of effective-
ness, the way we approach to GP provides IDS analysis
rules that at least achieve the same level of state-of-the-
art proposals. In addition, our system clearly outperforms
classical machine learning algorithms when the dataset is
adapted to have a more realistic prevalence of attacks. For
a NIDS is not only important the effectiveness but also
the efficiency. In intensive network usage environments IDS
must analyze huge amounts of data. If the NIDS is not
fast enough it will begin to drop the analysis of packets. In
this regard, the solutions provided by algorithms like C4.5
[2] generate wide and deep trees which may produce an
overhead on the analysis process. On the contrary, GP trees
can be quite simple being able to process more information
in less time. Furthermore, the use of an appropriate function
set for GP individuals results in analysis rules that provide
better knowledge about the nature of the attacks. Other
paradigms involve specialized structures which are nothing
like computer programs (e.g. weight vectors for neural
networks) what constrains the semantics of the generated
rules.
In addition to the use of traditional metrics to evaluate our
IDS, we have also used a recently presented metric (i.e. Cid)
[3] proposed specifically for the intrusion detection domain.
Our recent research [4] has proved that domain-aware GP
is able to produce efficient and easy to understand rules for
IDS, specifically to detect probe attacks. In our efforts to
provide an exhaustive comparison of the efficiency of our
approach it was necessary to use a dataset which covered
a wide range of different attacks types. To evaluate our
approach we have used the well known KDD-99 dataset.
Although this dataset has been criticized in some studies
[5], [6] due to questions such as its unrealistic prevalence of
attacks or its uncertain relation with reality, it is still used
in recent publications [7] and is considered as a standard
benchmark that most research uses to measure effectiveness.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II briefly reviews the basics of genetic programming.
Section III reviews related work done in the area. Section
IV describes the design of the proposed system. Section
V describes de KDD-99 Dataset. Then, Section VI shows
the experimental setup, results and discussion. Finally, last
section summarizes the main conclusions and future work.
II. GENETIC PROGRAMMING BASICS
Genetic Programming is a supervised search technique
devised by John R. Koza in 1992 [8]. GP is somehow similar
to Genetic Algorithms (GA), but instead of using chromo-
somes to encode the solution, it uses computer programs
represented as trees. IDS are itself computer programs and
its size and structure is not known in advance. Consequently,
the use of GP is more appropriate than GA for the problem
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at hand. The design of a GP algorithm requires the definition
of these elements:
• A population of individuals. The initial population
often consists of randomly generated individuals. Each
individual codifies a computer program or mathematical
function. It is usually represented by a tree composed
of functions and terminal. The function set specifies
which kind of functions can be part of the individuals.
The terminal set comprises all possible parameters for
the functions. Ephemeral Random Constants (ERCs)
are a highly used kind of terminals. An ERC is a
terminal node of the tree which is initialized randomly
and returns always the same value.
• A fitness function. For each generation, every individual
of the population must pass through the process of
natural selection. The fitness function evaluates the
quality of each individual.
• A set of genetic operators. For each generation of a
GP algorithm, some operations are performed on the
population. These operations are reproduction, muta-
tion and crossover. Reproduction does not change the
individual but generates an offspring from a given
population. Mutation randomly changes a function, a
terminal or a complete subtree of an individual. Finally,
crossover performs exchanges on two subtrees from
two individuals, thereby combining characteristics from
both of them into the new offspring.
A basic GP algorithm consists of a number of cycles. At
each cycle the fitness function is evaluated over the popu-
lation and the genetic operators are subsequently applied,
thus producing consecutive generations of populations of
computer programs, until an ending condition is reached.A
typical GP implementation has various parameters to be
adjusted, such as the population size and the maximum
number of generations.
III. RELATED WORK
The use of GP to generate IDS analysis rules was first
proposed in [9]. Standard GP as described by Koza has
not been often used in the IDS domain. Instead, use of
different variants of standard GP has been proposed, namely
Linear Genetic Programming (LGP), Multi Expression Pro-
gramming (MEP) and Gene Expression Programming (GEP)
[10]. LGP evolves individuals described in an imperative
programming language like C [11]. In LGP, the minimum
unit of evolution is a native machine code instruction. Song
et al. [12] applied LGP to the IDS domain obtaining similar,
but worse results than KDD-99 winner [13]. They also
claimed that solutions provided by their GP algorithm could
be used to extract knowledge. Nevertheless, their knowledge
extraction is focused on the results over the test dataset
and not on the inner characteristics of the GP individual.
In MEP each individual encodes several expressions. The
best expression of the individual is chosen as representative
for the individual. In GEP, individuals are encoded as linear
chromosomes which are expressed as expression trees. The
genotype is defined by the linear chromosomes and the
phenotype is defined by expression trees.
Abraham et al. [14], [15] reviewed and compared these
three derivates of standard GP and applied them to IDS
analysis rules generation. Results, which look good, were
obtained using training and testing sets which were a small
subset of the KDD-99 dataset. Therefore, results obtained
were not computed from the complete original dataset but
from an ad-hoc subset (not publicly available). This situation
makes a comparison with state-of-the-art unfeasible. As a
consequence, our experimental work focuses on the original
KDD-99 dataset in order to achieve a fair comparison with
top state-of-the-art. Faraoun [16] also proposed the use
of GP to evolve a multi-category classifier IDS. Results
obtained on the KDD-99 dataset were good, but the chosen
function set was composed by non-linear functions. Besides
the lack of justification for this function selection, these
functions do not allow the understanding of the generated
individuals, losing one of the potentials of the GP approach.
Many other approaches have been used to find good
analysis rules for IDS. Unsupervised techniques such as
cluster-based classification, K-means and SVM were pro-
posed on [17]. On section VI these works are compared
to our proposal in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and
semantics.
IV. DESIGN
The aim of this work is to show how domain-aware GP
can help in the production of effective, efficient and easy
to understand analysis rules to differentiate normal network
traffic from intrusive one. The design of the GP algorithm
requires the definition of the elements described in section
II such as the population of individuals, the function set, the
terminal set and the fitness function.
A. Population of individuals
Each individual of the population represents a potential
analysis rule for an IDS. An analysis rule decides (depending
on its input) whether there is an intrusion attempt or not. The
inputs of our analysis rules are a set of features describing a
connection and the network state (in our evaluation a KDD-
99 dataset entry).
B. Function Set Selection
One of the goals of using GP in the intrusion detection
field is to produce analysis rules which can be used to extract
domain knowledge. Functions have been selected having this
idea in mind. As the algorithm is designed to distinguish
between two categories (i.e. normal and intrusive), our
functions produce only two possible values as output. Thus,
our functions are modified versions of the typical logic
operators and, or, not, greater, least, equal and different
that produce only two logical values (i.e. 0 or 1).
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C. Terminal Set Selection
First group of terminals consists of each feature of KDD-
99 records (a total of 41). Second is composed of two
Ephemeral Random Constants (ERC). The first ERC takes
real values between -1.0 and 1.0. The second takes integer
values and is constrained between 0 and 100. This will allow
the GP algorithm to generate rules such as ”porti == 80”
which will allow easy extraction of knowledge.
D. Fitness Function
Usually the prevalence of attacks is very low in a real
network. As a consequence, accuracy (i.e. percentage of hits)
is not appropriate to measure the effectiveness of an IDS. In
this regard, it is important to note that a naive IDS that states
that every event is intrusive would achieve good accuracy
being a bad detector. Nevertheless, we have observed that
most GP approaches to intrusion detection rules have used
a fitness function based on accuracy [16], [15]. To avoid
this kind of situations, classical IDS effectiveness evaluation
provides the trade-off between the hit rate (H) and the false
alarm rate (F ) (defined in the next subsection). Recently
a new one-dimensional metric, namely Cid [3], has been
proposed. It is based on information theory and takes into
account the hit rate, the false alarm rate and the prevalence
of attacks. Consequently, we have used two different fitness
functions. The former is a basic metric on the IDS domain
which measures the difference between the hit and the false
alarm rate. The latter is the Intrusion Detection Capability
(Cid). In the following we describe both.
1) Hit Rate Minus False Alarm Rate: We define the hit
rate (H) and the false alarm rate (F ) as follows:
H =
Attacks classified as Attacks
Attacks
(1)
F =
Non− attacks classified as Attacks
Non− attacks (2)
H and F provide a two-dimensional measure of the
quality of individuals. Our first fitness function transforms
this two-dimensional space in a one dimensional measure
which aims to maximize H while minimizing F:
Fit1 = H − F (3)
Therefore, an individual is better as it has higher H and
lower F . The main drawback of this function is that two very
different individuals can have the same fitness. For instance,
let us suppose two individuals with Fitness1 = 0.8. One
can have H = 0.8 and F = 0 and the other H = 1
and F = 0.2. Although this drawback, we have used this
fitness function to provide an exhaustive comparison against
other proposals. The second fitness tries to overcome the
aforementioned drawback.
2) Intrusion Detection Capability: Our second fitness
function is derived from recent research on IDS evaluation.
Recent studies have proposed a new metric for IDS effective-
ness evaluation called Intrusion Detection Capability (Cid)
which is based on information theory [3]. Cid measures the
amount of uncertainty of the input resolved once the IDS
output is obtained, producing one single value for measuring
IDS effectiveness. Unlike other IDS metrics, like our first
fitness function, Cid takes into account the prevalence of
attacks in the dataset (B) besides the hit rate (H) and the
false positive rate (F ):
Fit2 = Cid =− BHlog
BH
BH + HF
− B(1−H)log B(1−H)
B(1−H) + (1− B)(1− F )
− (1− B)(1− F )log (1− B)(1− F )
(1− B)(1− F ) + B(1−H)
− (1− B)Flog (1− B)F
(1− B)F + BH
(4)
Cid is more sensitive than traditional metrics in realistic
situations. Authors proved that in real scenarios, in which
the percentage of intrusions in the whole traffic data is low,
small changes on F have a high impact on Cid. More details
on this metric can be found on [3], [18].
V. THE KDD-99 DATASET
As stated before, we have used the KDD-99 dataset
[19] that derives from raw traffic captured during MIT/LL
1998 evaluation [20]. This dataset was first employed for
a machine learning competition over the intrusion detec-
tion domain. Training and testing datasets were created at
Columbia University after a data mining process on the raw
MIT/LL data. Raw data was divided in connection records
that covered about 100 bytes of a connection between two
parties in a limited time. Each connection record is described
by 41 attributes and also contains the corresponding class in-
dicating if it presents normal or hostile activity. A complete
description of the each attribute can be found in [21]. The
dataset is available at California University website1.
Table I shows the distribution of attacks and normal traffic
instances on KDD-99. Unfortunately, the KDD dataset does
not represent at all a realistic prevalence of attacks. This
has been one of the main critics to this dataset [5], [6]. To
avoid this drawback, some researchers have proposed the
modification of the prevalence of attacks in the dataset. We
have tested our approach against both scenarios in order to
achieve, first, a quantitative and fair comparison with state-
of-the-art and, second, a measure of effectiveness under a
realistic framework. For the first set of experiments we have
used the original dataset. For the second, each normal traffic
record has been replicated 4.000 times, as in [18], providing
a more realistic prevalence of attacks (i. e. 0.001).
1http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
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Table I
CLASS DISTRIBUTION OF THE KDD-99 DATASET
Train Test
Normal 97278(19.69%) 60593(19.48%)
Intrusions 396743(80.31%) 250428(80.52%)
Total 494021(100%) 311021(100%)
VI. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
We have evaluated our approach through an execution of
several experiments considering the fitness functions defined
in Section IV-D. To perform our experiments we have used
ECJ2, which is an evolutionary computation framework
developed in Java.
A. Experimental Setup
An experiment consists on evolving individuals on the
training data and then testing the best individuals over the
testing dataset. Experiments have been carried out using both
fitness functions. Our set of experiments has been divided
in two groups. First uses the original KDD-99 to perform
training and testing. Second uses the modified version of the
dataset in order to test a more realistic scenario. In this case,
experiments have been carried out only with the Cid fitness
function, as the modifications on the KDD-99 do not affect
H nor F . Each experiment has been repeated 30 times with
different randomly generated seeds. Overall, three different
trainings have been performed (Table II).
Table II
DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTS PERFORMED
Fitness Function Dataset Runs
Experiment 1 H − F Original KDD-99 30
Experiment 2 Cid Original KDD-99 30
Experiment 3 Cid Modified KDD-99 30
Every experiment has been performed using the same
parameters (Table III). For each experiment, maximum depth
of generated trees has been restricted in order to obtain
more efficient and simpler individuals which allow an easy
interpretation from generated rules.
B. Results
The evolution of the best individual through generations
over the training dataset is depicted in Figure 1. Although
experiments correspond to different fitness functions they
have been all represented in a single plot for comparison
purposes. The improvement that the evolutive process pro-
duces is greater for the second fitness.
As depicted on Figure 2, increasing the number of gener-
ations in any experiment would not produce any significant
improvement on the GP individuals.
2http://cs.gmu.edu/ eclab/projects/ecj/
Table III
LIST OF PARAMETERS USED IN EXPERIMENTS DESCRIBED IN TABLE II
Parameter Value
Generations 52
Individuals 1024
Maximum depth 6 and 4
Initialization Ramped Half and Half
Mutation Probability 0.1
Crossover Probability 0.9
Elitisim Yes
Selection Mechanism Tournament
Tournament Size 7
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Figure 1. Fitness evolution for the best individual in each experiment
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Figure 2. Average fitness evolution in each experiment during the training
process.
Table IV compares the best and average results obtained
in experiments 1 and 2 with top state-of-the-art proposals
that refer results to the original test dataset. There are other
results in the literature that even overcome the KDD-99
Winner, but they have been obtained using filtered versions
(which are no publicly available) of the KDD-99 dataset.
In order to have a fair comparison we have not included
them. The best individual obtained in experiment 1 achieves
similar results to the leading system [13]. In addition, the
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Table IV
COMPARISON OF BEST INDIVIDUALS AGAINST STATE-OF-THE-ART
RESULTS USING THE ORIGINAL DATASET
H F Cid
KDD Winner [13] 0.9181 0.0055 0.6774
Best Linear GP [12] 0.8941 0.0068 0.6226
Faraoun GP [16] 0.925 0.0135 0.6630
Support Vector Machines [17] 0.98 0.10 0.5534
Self Organizing Maps [22] 0.89 0.046 0.4894
C 4.5 Tree 0.9099 0.0056 0.6590
Best Experiment 1 0.9131 0.0133 0.6565
Best Experiment 2 0.9180 0.0143 0.6652
Average Experiment 1 0.8024 0.0621 0.3988
Average Experiment 2 0.7915 0.0579 0.5006
best individual obtained in experiment 2 offers a better Cid
than the one from experiment 1 and is very close to the KDD
winner, beating all other approaches. These results show the
suitability of the GP design proposed, particularly the use
of Cid as fitness function.
Results achieved by the best individual of experiment 3
demonstrate the high sensitivity of Cid metric for a realistic
prevalence of attacks. Thus, as summarized in Table V, it
clearly outperforms classical machine learning algorithms in
terms of Cid being a 15% more effective than SVM. The best
individual achieves an extremely low ratio of false positives
while keeping a hit rate close to the best.
Table V
COMPARISON OF BEST INDIVIDUALS AGAINST STATE-OF-THE-ART
RESULTS USING THE MODIFIED DATASET
H F Cid
Naive Bayes [18] 0.9002 0.0257 0.4258
C4.5 Tree [18] 0.9103 0.0176 0.4258
Support Vector Machines [18] 0.8761 0.0036 0.5642
Best Experiment 3 0.8938 8.747E-4 0.7105
Average Experiment 3 0.7626 0.0069 0.4994
Table VI3 shows the best individuals obtained represented
as C function calls. Shorter individuals are easier to interpret.
We have obtained one extremely short (best experiment 1)
with high effectiveness (in terms of H , F and Cid).
As an example, Figure 3 represents best individual ob-
tained in experiment 14.This analysis rule states (besides
more implications) that if there are more than one connection
to the same host (attr32) and at least one of them is from
the same service (attr35), but in the current record there
is no data transmitted (attr6) because there was an error
(attr4), then there is an intrusion going on.
Programs generated by means of GP can be composed
of a relatively small set of function calls (simple operators
3attri refers to feature number i of the KDD-99 dataset
4note that or(attr4, attr4) cannot be replaced by attr4, if attr4 = 3
then or(attr4, attr4) = 1.
Table VI
BEST GP INDIVIDUALS OBTAINED EXPRESSED IN C PSEUDOCODE
Type Individual
Best Experiment 1 eq(or(attr4,attr4),neq(attr6,and(attr32,attr35)))
Best Experiment 2 neq(neq(attr4, neq(neq(attr4, attr10),
attr10)), neq(attr6, least(and(attr2,
and(attr15, not(attr23))), attr35)))
Best Experiment 3 and(grater(neq(or(grater(attr35,neq(grater
(or(attr23, attr25), attr36), attr29)),
neq(attr14, attr5)),least(attr7, attr35)),
eq(attr24, neq(attr14, attr5))),
grater(grater(neq(or(attr6, attr37),
neq(grater(or(attr23, attr25), attr36),
attr29)), least(not(attr12), neq(attr14,
attr5))), or(least(grater(attr26, attr13),
attr6), attr31)))
Figure 3. Tree representation of best individual obtained in experiment 1
like and, equal, etc.). We have not compared execution time
of different techniques, as it depends on the implementation
and computer where the tests are performed. Instead, we
have compared the number of nodes of best GP individuals
against state-of-the-art proposals and a C4.5 tree generated
by us. Table VII shows that GP generated programs have
the fewest number of nodes and function calls.
Table VII
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN STATE-OF-THE-ART PROPOSALS
AND BEST GP INDIVIDUALS. GP REDUCES THE SIZE OF THE SOLUTIONS
Functions Leaves Total Nodes
C4.5 Tree 62 332 394
KDD-99 Winner [16] – – 500
Faraoun GP [16] 86 – 86
Best Experiment 1 4 5 9
Best Experiment 2 9 9 18
Best Experiment 3 25 25 50
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a domain-aware GP
approach to the generation of network traffic analysis rules.
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We have carefully thought the fitness function and function
set in order to produce effective, efficient and easy to
understand rules. Thus, two fitness functions, that take into
account the IDS evaluation field, have been tested. The well-
known KDD-99 dataset has been used as input data for
training and testing in such a way that a comparison with
state-of-the-art research was possible. Results point out that
our approach competes in effectiveness with top proposals
and even improve them in realistic scenarios. In addition,
generated rules are much shorter. As a consequence, our
system is more efficient increasing the throughput while
reducing the time to process each incoming event. Finally,
these automatically generated individuals can help us to
understand why an event is considered intrusive due to their
simple structure.
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